Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers by Glenn Hoetker et al.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Vol. 53, No. 2, February 2007, pp. 178–191
issn0025-1909 eissn1526-5501 07 5302 0178
informs ®
doi10.1287/mnsc.1060.0630
©2007 INFORMS
Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier
Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
Glenn Hoetker
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, College of Business, 350 Wohlers Hall,
1206 S. Sixth Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820, ghoetker@uiuc.edu
Anand Swaminathan
Graduate School of Management, University of California at Davis, One Shields Avenue,
Davis, California 95616-8609, aswaminathan@ucdavis.edu
Will Mitchell
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, P.O. Box 90120, Durham, North Carolina 27708,
will.mitchell@duke.edu
M
odularity in product design and ﬂexible supply chains is increasingly common in buyer–supplier rela-
tionships. Although the beneﬁts of supply chain ﬂexibility and component modularity for end-product
manufacturers are accepted, little is known about their impact on suppliers. We advance the literature on mod-
ularity by exploring how three aspects of a supplier’s relationships with its customers affect the supplier’s
survival: duration of buyer–supplier relationships, autonomy from customers, and links to prominent buyers.
We compared the effects of these aspects of buyer–supplier relationships for low- and high-modularity com-
ponents. Using data on U.S. carburetor and clutch manufacturers from 1918 to 1942, we found that suppliers
of high-modularity components beneﬁted more from autonomy provided by potential customers, whereas sup-
pliers of low-modularity components beneﬁted more from ties to higher status customers. Both beneﬁted from
autonomy generated by existing customers. Thus, relationships that require trust and extensive sets of inter-
ﬁrm routines, as do those for low-modularity components, led to both greater relationship beneﬁts and greater
constraints.
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The evolution of many industries over the past
century has been characterized by two related phe-
nomena in buyer–supplier relationships: increasingly
modular products and a shift to more ﬂexible, disag-
gregated supply chains (Langlois and Robertson 1992,
Zenger and Hesterly 1997, Schilling and Steensma
2001). Components that exhibit low modularity re-
quire customization to ﬁt in a customer’s product and,
indeed, may also require adaptation of the customer’s
product to ﬁt the component’s technology. By con-
trast, highly modular components can be incorporated
into multiple end products with little component or
end-product change (Schilling 2000). Increasing com-
ponent modularity facilitates supply chain ﬂexibil-
ity by reducing the need for specialized interfaces
between an end-good producer and component sup-
pliers (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). This trend raises
the issue of how different aspects of relationships
with buyers inﬂuence supplier performance, which
has been a long-standing interest of business strategy
research (Martin et al. 1998, Dyer 1996a).
Differences in supply relationships can affect the
performance of both buyers and suppliers. Clearly,
component modularity and the resultant supply chain
ﬂexibility can improve the performance of buyers
(Vickery et al. 1999, Mikkola 2003). Component mod-
ularity improves a buyer’s ability to drop, add, or
change suppliers in response to changing conditions
(Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995, Galunic and Eisen-
hardt 2001). Rather than being locked into preexisting
relationships, a buyer can choose the best supplier
at any point (Hoetker 2006, Ulrich 1995). Because a
buyer can consider a larger number of suppliers, it
can consider the outcomes of multiple experiments in
how to construct each component, which increases the
expected value of the approach that the buyer selects
(Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004, Langlois and Robertson
1992).
However, it is not immediately obvious how buy-
ers’ enhanced ability to switch suppliers affects the
latter. On the one hand, a supplier’s bargaining posi-
tion weakens when it is easier for a buyer to walk
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away. On the other hand, if all buyers can switch sup-
pliers easily, a supplier may be able to ﬁnd a new
buyer easily. The end result is ambiguous. Given the
impact of buyer–supplier relationships on ﬁrms and
industries (Clark and Fujimoto 1991), it is important
to understand how component modularity affects
supply chain relationships.1
We study how modularity shapes three aspects of a
supplier’s buyer relationships that prior research sug-
gests may inﬂuence supplier survival: the duration
of relationships with buyers (Levinthal and Fichman
1988), autonomy from buyers (Burt 1992), and links
to prominent buyers (Podolny 1993). We advance the
modularity literature by examining how the degree
of modularity of the product exchanged in a buyer–
supplier relationship conditions the inﬂuence of each
aspect. We also contribute to the literature on inter-
ﬁrm relationships by showing that the beneﬁts and
constraints of a ﬁrm’s relationships derive in large
part from the needs of the relationships, including
trust and the type of interﬁrm coordination routines
required. We ﬁnd that relationships requiring trust
and routines to be extensive tend to have greater ben-
eﬁts and constraints than those that require less trust
and less extensive routines. Furthermore, relationship
structure is more important for buyer–supplier con-
nections that require high trust and extensive coor-
dination. The study examined carburetor and clutch
suppliers in the U.S. auto industry from 1918 to
1942. Clutches were more modular than carburetors
throughout this period. The data were based on all
buyer–supplier relationships in the populations of
component suppliers and automobile assemblers dur-
ing the period.
Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we develop arguments concerning how
duration, autonomy, and buyer prominence inﬂuence
supplier survival. Although multiple streams of the
interﬁrm relationship literature have examined these
factors, the role of modularity has received little con-
ceptual or empirical attention, and we are unaware of
any study of supplier performance that has addressed
these three aspects jointly.
A component is modular to the extent that it can
be incorporated into a product without needing to be
changed or requiring the rest of the product to be
1 Modularity sometimes reﬂects the design choices made for a spe-
ciﬁc ﬁrm’s product (Baldwin and Clark 2000), but similar degrees
of modularity commonly characterize a component, product, and
system, reﬂecting the underlying physics of the component, the cur-
rent state of technological development, and the level of industry-
wide standardization (see, e.g., Langlois and Robertson 1992). Our
focus was on the situation in which all buyers and suppliers face a
similar state of modularity for a type of component.
changed. Components with low modularity require
customization to ﬁt in a customer’s product or adap-
tation of the customer’s product. By contrast, compo-
nents with high modularity can be incorporated into
multiple end products with little component or end-
product reﬁnement (Schilling 2000). Modularity is a
continuous concept, but we will simply refer to com-
ponents that stand far apart in this spectrum as hav-
ing low modularity or high modularity.
Duration of Buyer–Supplier Relationships and
Supplier Survival
A long-term relationship generates value for both a
buyer and a supplier. The supplier beneﬁts directly by
capturing some of this value and indirectly from the
enhanced likelihood of continued business from the
buyer, which gains a competitive advantage from
the efﬁciencies of the relationship.
The value of a long-term supply relationship arises
from the development of mutual knowledge of part-
ners’ capabilities and routines (Ring and Van de
Ven 1994), trust between partners (Gulati 1995), and
relationship-speciﬁc routines for the coordination of
partners (Mitchell and Singh 1996, Asanuma 1989).
These three factors create value in multiple ways.
Communication and coordination can lead to a supe-
rior product that can be sold at a premium price
(Dyer 1996b). In addition, communication, coordina-
tion, and lower governance costs resulting from trust
translate into lower component costs (Dyer 1996b,
Uzzi 1997), which can increase sales by lowering the
price of the ﬁnal product and can increase the margin
between production cost and sales price. Suppliers
may beneﬁt by directly capturing some of the value
created by the relationship (Dussauge et al. 2000).
A supplier in a long-term relationship with a buyer
also beneﬁts from the enhanced likelihood of contin-
ued business from the buyer, which will be less likely
to leave the supplier because of the value generated
by the relationship’s competitive advantages (Eccles
1981, Simon 1969). In addition to the beneﬁts of con-
tinued custom, the supplier may be able to extract
more favorable conditions in negotiations with the
buyer, given the latter’s low willingness to leave the
supplier (Williamson 1985).
However, a long-term relationship will promote
supplier survival only to the degree that its bene-
ﬁts are relevant and value-creating, outcomes that, we
argue, are contingent on the modularity of the com-
ponent being traded. We expect the value of a long-
term relationship to be greater for low-modularity
components. The supply of low-modularity compo-
nents requires the relationship-speciﬁc knowledge,
trust, and routines that ﬂow from long-term relation-
ships because of the need for ongoing interaction
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and mutual adjustments. As a supplier provides low-
modularity components to a buyer over time, these
beneﬁts cumulate and generate value.
Bycontrast,supplyinghigh-modularitycomponents
requires general investments that are more transpar-
ent and derive less beneﬁt from relationship-speciﬁc
knowledge, trust, and routines. Thus, a long-term
relationship generates less value and consequently
less beneﬁt for suppliers of highly modular compo-
nents. Less value is available for a supplier to capture,
and the supplier has both less assurance of continued
custom from a long-term buyer and less advantage in
negotiations with the buyer.
Theory and prior empirical work are unclear as
to whether greater beneﬁts are gained from a sin-
gle long-term relationship or from a portfolio of such
relationships. A primary relationship with one long-
term partner, possibly supplemented with shorter
relationships with other buyers, may provide a strong
foundation for supplier success, as exempliﬁed by a
supplier that has a primary long-term relationship
within the keiretsu of a Japanese automotive manu-
facturer (Asanuma 1989). Alternatively, suppliers may
beneﬁt most if they have long-term relationships with
several buyers that provide a varied base of knowl-
edge, trust, and routines. We tested both aspects of
relationship duration.
We make no main effect prediction for duration and
survival because it is theoretically ambiguous at what
level of modularity duration ceases to have a discern-
able effect on supplier survival. Nonetheless, theory
leads to a clear comparative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Relationship duration will reduce the
failure rates of suppliers of low-modularity components
more than the failure rates of high-modularity component
suppliers.
We recognize that long-term relationships may also
give rise to constraints. Recent work has drawn
attention to potential limitations of strong interor-
ganizational ties (e.g., Gargiulo and Benassi 2000).
These limitations include the development of cog-
nitive “lock-in,” which ﬁlters out information from
beyond the relationship, and relational inertia, which
makes organizations reluctant to terminate relation-
ships, even if their value declines. The hypothesis
reﬂects the most common argument in prior research,
but the analysis will help assess whether the beneﬁts
outweigh the constraints.
Supplier Autonomy and Performance
We continue by considering a supplier’s autonomy
relative to its customers. Early work on this aspect of
interﬁrm relationships has focused on a ﬁrm’s depen-
dence on other organizations for resources (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978, Cook 1977, Emerson 1962). Much
of the more recent work has instead highlighted
autonomy, which is the degree to which a supplier can
act independently of its buyers (Burt 1992).
A supplier’s autonomy in its dealings with a buyer
stems from the difference between how dependent it
is on the buyer and how dependent the buyer is on
it (Burt 1992). A supplier will be highly dependent
on a buyer if it sells only to that buyer and would
experience difﬁculty ﬁnding an alternative buyer for
its output (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, this
dependency can be balanced by the buyer’s depen-
dency on the supplier (Cook 1977). Such dependency
exists if the buyer has no alternative sources for the
components that the supplier provides or if the ﬁrms
have formed complex routines that span their bound-
aries, making it difﬁcult for the buyer to replace the
supplier easily (Baker 1990, Singh and Mitchell 1996).
A supplier with a single buyer that cannot obtain the
supplier’s component elsewhere may be in a better
position than a supplier with several buyers that can
all easily switch to alternative suppliers.
We predict that suppliers lacking autonomy from
their buyers will face performance problems that stem
from opportunistic behavior by the buyers. Although
specialization economies are available when a sup-
plier is tightly bound to a buyer, the accompany-
ing lack of autonomy makes the supplier vulnerable.
The buyer may use its power to extract rents from
the supplier, limit the supplier’s ability to sell goods
to other buyers, or otherwise constrain the supplier
(Baker 1990, Williamson 1993). Financial problems at
the DaimlerChrysler automotive ﬁrm during 2001,
for instance, led the company to press its dependent
suppliers. Suppliers that had beneﬁted from close
relationships with Chrysler found themselves facing
failure as they were forced to cut prices.
In addition, because having a range of buyers gen-
erates supplier autonomy, a supplier with high auton-
omy will be harmed less by losing a given buyer’s
business. Furthermore, because buyers having few
options for supply also generates supplier autonomy,
a supplier with high autonomy may be less likely to
lose a given buyer’s business.
We refer to autonomy based on the balance between
how dependent a supplier is on its current buyers
and how dependent those buyers are on it as cur-
rent autonomy to distinguish it from potential autonomy,
which we discuss below. We expect current auton-
omy to beneﬁt most suppliers, although it is unclear
whether it will be of greater beneﬁt to suppliers
of low-modularity or high-modularity components.
High current autonomy should provide all suppli-
ers greater sales opportunities and help them resist
the demands of a few buyers. The strongest effect
might accrue to suppliers of low-modularity prod-
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On the other hand, a supplier of a high-modularity
component can sell it to multiple customers with min-
imal modiﬁcation, creating greater economies of scale
than is possible with a low-modularity product. We
examine this issue empirically.
A supplier’s potential autonomy measures its op-
portunities to form ties to new buyers—buyers with
which it does not currently trade—relative to the buy-
ers’ opportunities to develop ties to new suppliers.
The presence of potential buyers beyond those with
which a supplier already trades increases its available
alternatives. Even if a supplier has only one buyer, it
is better off if there are 10 buyers to which it could
start selling than if there is only one other potential
buyer.2 The potential autonomy of a supplier is high
when it has many buyers available outside its cur-
rent set of buyers and its buyers have few alternatives
outside of their current suppliers.
We expect the beneﬁts of potential autonomy for
suppliers to increase with increasing modularity. The
availability of potential partners strengthens a ﬁrm’s
bargaining position only to the degree that they are
credible alternatives to existing partners. Low-mod-
ularity components require relation-speciﬁc coordi-
nation (Monteverde and Teece 1982), meaning that
buyers and suppliers cannot easily switch partners,
even if many other seemingly potential suppliers and
buyers exist.
By contrast, high-modularity components generate
fewer requirements for relation-speciﬁc coordination,
so buyers and suppliers can switch partners more eas-
ily. The greater availability of potential partners helps
mitigate the threat of opportunism. Also, it is easier
for suppliers of high-modularity inputs to ﬁnd new
buyers because switching costs are low.
Hypothesis 2. Potential autonomy will reduce the fail-
ure rates of suppliers of high-modularity components more
than the failure rates of suppliers of low-modularity com-
ponents.
Customer Status and Supplier Survival
It is often difﬁcult for buyers to evaluate the quality
of a potential supplier’s products. Lacking complete
information about the supplier’s technical sophistica-
tion, reliability, and quality, they frequently look for
secondary indicators (Podolny 1993). Because buyers
often trust the ability of high-status buyers to judge
the quality of their suppliers, potential buyers may
imitate the supplier choices of such prominent buyers
(Stuart 1998).
2 Although market structure inﬂuences autonomy, two suppliers in
the same market could have different autonomy levels, depend-
ing on their relationships with customers and the customers’ other
relationships.
Walker et al. (1997) found empirically that biotech-
nology ﬁrms with higher status had more subsequent
relationships with new partners (see also Powell
et al. 1996). Similarly, Baker et al. (1998) found that
advertising agencies with higher social status main-
tained client links. Not surprisingly, multiple studies
have shown that ties to high-status partners improve
performance and survival (Stuart et al. 1999, Rockart
2003).
We argue that buyers are more inﬂuenced by the
status of a supplier’s other customers when the sup-
plier provides a low-modularity component because
ambiguity about the supplier’s quality is higher
(Podolny 1993). A buyer of a low-modularity compo-
nent must assess both the quality of a supplier’s com-
ponent and the supplier’s ability to make the changes
needed to integrate it into the buyer’s product. The
latter is hard to assess in advance, leading buyers to
rely on high-status customers’ judgments as a signal
of supplier quality. In contrast, a buyer of a high-
modularity component has less need to judge the
ability of a supplier to adapt its component because
integrating it into the buyer’s product will not require
extensive changes. Thus, buyers can determine a sup-
plier’s quality directly by examining the components
it produces and have less need to rely on the judg-
ment of prominent customers before entering into a
relationship.3
In addition, a buyer can more easily abandon a
poor supplier of a high-modularity component, which
needs less relation-speciﬁc coordination, than a poor
supplier of a low-modularity component. Because of
the difﬁculty of switching suppliers of low-modular-
ity components, buyers value information about sup-
pliers’ quality more highly, including the status of its
customers.
Thus, suppliers of low-modularity components can
beneﬁt from the strong signal of quality generated by
afﬁliation with a high-status buyer. Again, we have
no hypothesis for the main effect of customer status
but make the following comparative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Customer status will reduce the failure
rates of suppliers of low-modularity components more than
the failure rates of suppliers of high-modularity components.
Data and Methods
We studied the survival of U.S. suppliers of carbu-
retors and clutches in the auto industry. We chose
these components for several reasons: Their degree of
modularity differed signiﬁcantly, they were important
inputs in automobile production, and the ﬁrms that
manufactured them showed substantial diversity. The
annual statistics and speciﬁcations issue of Automo-
tive Industries, which was produced from 1918 to 1972,
3 A reviewer thoughtfully noted that this logic echoes the signaling
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was our primary data source. The analysis focused
on the 1918 to 1942 period, because there were few
ﬁrms in the component sectors that we studied after
the Second World War.
Automotive Industries listed ﬁrst-tier suppliers—
ﬁrms that sold components directly to assemblers—by
automobile model. Because the publication provided
speciﬁcations at the level of a division or model with-
out listing overarching companies, we used informa-
tion from Automobile Quarterly (1971), Smith (1968),
Mandel (1982), Gunnell (1982), and Kimes (1989) to
construct life histories of assemblers and to con-
nect divisions and models to parent companies. After
aggregating the data to the ﬁrm level, we constructed
a matrix of ties between supplier ﬁrms and buyer
ﬁrms for carburetors and clutches for each year. Auto-
motive Industries professed to list every model of auto-
mobile produced in the United States. This compre-
hensiveness allowed us to create a complete inventory
of buyer–supplier relationships for these components.
We gathered information about the performance
and life histories of suppliers from several sources,
including corporate annual reports, Poor’s Industrial
Manual, Moody’s Manual of Industrial Securities, the
Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, Ward’s
Automotive Yearbook, the trade press, corporate Web
sites, and correspondence with suppliers. The statis-
tics and speciﬁcations issue of Automotive Industries
provided information on annual shipments for assem-
blers of at least medium size. We supplemented
this information with data from the Automotive News
100-Year Almanac and 1996 Market Data Book (1996).
Carburetors were our low-modularity product, and
clutches were our high-modularity product. Carbure-
tor design and production required customization to
and of ignition systems, fuel systems, power trains,
and other sections of automobiles. Carburetors were
complex, unstandardized goods throughout the study
period (Page 1918, Dyke 1923). As Newcomb and
Spurr (1989, p. 64, emphasis added) noted, “[E]ven
in the 1960s, the design of the system was still very
much a matter of trial and error, and the ﬁnal design
largely a matter of compromise. A layout that could suit
one engine might give poor results on another.” An early
account emphasized that “[s]ome elements of carbu-
retor design concerned with adaptability to a given
engine or to operating conditions of a given engine
or to a given fuel   may not be brought out by the
study of proportions alone, or to study ﬂow alone, or
even to any particular sort of pulsating ﬂow. These are
all matters worthy of careful consideration, but some-
what intangible and elusive in character” (Lucke and
Willhöfft 1917, pp. 64–65). Thus, the design and man-
ufacturing processes required a considerable degree
of give and take between supplier and buyer.
Clutches, by contrast, had achieved high modu-
larity and become relatively standard by the begin-
ning of the period. Even before 1920, Page (1918,
p. 635) noted that “friction clutches are simple in
form, easily understood, and may be kept in adjust-
ment and repair without difﬁculty.” The relatively
simple single-plate clutch quickly became the choice
of most automobile manufacturers and required little
customization for speciﬁc automobile models (Dyke
1923). Newcomb and Spurr (1989, p. 221) stated that
“once established [by about 1919] the basic principles
of the clutch remained unchanged for many years,
though there was considerable improvement in the
detail design.”
Dependent Variable and Statistical Method
We deﬁned supplier failure as a supplier shutting down
its production in the automotive carburetor (clutch)
market. We estimated the hazard rate (the instan-
taneous rate of supplier dissolution) using a piece-
wise exponential model. The model was ﬂexible with
respect to the form of age dependence and appro-
priate in the presence of “left censoring” (Guo 1993,
Barnett and Hansen 1996), which occurred in our
sample. The hazard rate for a given supplier i at age t,
given covariates Xit, was
ri t = ir t exp Xit   (1)
The model’s assumption was a baseline transition
rate, r t , that was constant across all suppliers of age t
but varied over age ranges. We used three age ranges
in our estimation, dividing the data into ﬁrm ages
of less than 5 years, 6 to 10 years, and greater than
10 years. The results were robust to selecting other cut-
off points as well as to using other parametric forms
of age dependence in the mortality rate, including the
Weibull, log-logistic, and lognormal speciﬁcations.
Because we observed multiple annual spells for
each supplier i, we used a shared frailty model
(Gutierrez 2002), in which it is assumed each sup-
plier may have had a systemically lower or higher
rate of failure for reasons not explained by the covari-
ates. This difference was captured in Equation (1)
by the term  i, a random positive quantity with
a mean of 1 and variance of  , orthogonal to the
observed covariates. Suppliers for which this quan-
tity was greater than 1 had an increased rate of fail-
ure (were more frail) for reasons not explained by the
covariates. Those with a value of  i less than 1 had a
decreased rate of failure. This model provided the sur-
vival analysis analogue to a random-effects model in
standard regression. We report models with a gamma-
distributed heterogeneity term with probability den-
sity function,
g   =
 1/ −1exp − /  
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We also estimated models with an inverse Gaussian
distribution for the heterogeneity term to check for
robustness.
Our data were annual, so we updated time-varying
covariates each year. We treated all annual spells as
right-censored except those that ended with dissolu-
tion of the supplier. We treated dissolutions as occur-
ring midway though the year to reduce estimation
bias (Peterson and Marsden 1991). We treated divesti-
tures that occurred during the study period (11 car-
buretor and 6 clutch suppliers were affected) as cen-
soring events.
Separate failure rate models were estimated for
carburetor and clutch suppliers. Combining the two
populations would have mistakenly constrained the
effects of ﬁrm- and industry-level variables to be
equal for the populations. Two ﬁrms made both com-
ponents. Given our sample size and the small propor-
tion of ﬁrms involved, we did not control for their
presence in both populations. For carburetor suppli-
ers, there were 225 ﬁrm-year observations (35 sep-
arate carburetor suppliers) between 1918 and 1942,
with 24 dissolutions. For clutch suppliers, there were
130 ﬁrm-year observations (30 separate clutch sup-
pliers) between 1918 and 1937, with 23 dissolutions.
These counts did not include assemblers that verti-
cally integrated into production of the components.
Our calculations of current and potential autonomy
took those assemblers into account, but we did not
include them in the supplier populations because the
forces driving their involvement in component pro-
duction differed from those driving the independent
suppliers.
Focal Independent Variables
Relationship Duration. We measured the duration
of a supplier’s relationship with an assembler as the
cumulative years it supplied the given component for
at least one model produced by that assembler. We
reset this count to 0 if there was a span of greater
than ﬁve consecutive years during which the supplier
did not supply a component for at least one model
produced by that buyer. Resetting the count captured
the effect of the decay of relation-speciﬁc routines and
trust. In the case of an acquisition by either a sup-
plier or an assembler, we based our calculations on the
acquiring ﬁrm, assuming its routines would dominate.
We used two measures of duration. Maximum dura-
tion of customer relationship recorded the longest single
relationship a supplier had with any current cus-
tomer. Average relationship duration recorded the mean
length of all of the supplier’s current relationships.
Autonomy. Building on Cook and Emerson (1978),
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Emerson (1962), and Burt
(1980), our measure of autonomy captured two fac-
tors: (1) The more alternatives available to a ﬁrm,
the less dependent it was on any given partner; and
(2) the power of ﬁrm A over ﬁrm B depended on
the difference between A’s dependence on B and B’s
dependence on A. We measured the current autonomy
of a supplier as the ratio of the number of assem-
blers to which it sold to the mean number of suppliers
its customers had. This variable captured the relative
dependence of the supplier on its current buyers. We
measured the potential autonomy of a supplier as the
ratio of the number of existing assemblers to which
it did not sell to the mean number of existing suppli-
ers from which its customers did not buy. This vari-
able captured the relative abilities of a supplier and
its buyers to create new ties.
We measured autonomy using ratios because it is
an inherently relative concept. Our interest was not
whether a supplier had three or six customers; in-
stead, our interest was whether it had twice or only
half as many trading partners as its customers did.4
We also deﬁned a complementary measure of au-
tonomy, based on customer vertical integration. An
assembler can replace a supplier by vertically inte-
grating production of the component the supplier
provided. Therefore, we included the proportion of
a focal supplier’s customers that were vertically inte-
grated as a measure of autonomy. When this value
is high, the supplier has less autonomy, and we thus
expected a high proportion of vertically integrated
customers to increase suppliers’ dissolution rates.
Correlations among the three measures of auton-
omy were low and often negative. The data, therefore,
supported treating autonomy as a multidimensional
construct, as we did in our theoretical development.
Maximum Customer Status. We measured status
in terms of a supplier’s highest status buyer, which
would be the focus of other ﬁrms’ search for infor-
mation about the supplier’s capabilities. The fact that
a highly respected assembler chose a ﬁrm to supply
components acts as a strong signal of that supplier’s
skills.
We measured customer status according to three
categories prominent in the automobile industry dur-
ing the study period. The contemporary literature
clearly indicated that there were three distinct groups
of assemblers by 1918: (1) the major assemblers (Ford,
General Motors and, following the acquisition of
Dodge, Chrysler); (2) the major independents, which
were referred to by that term (e.g., Hudson and
4 Measuring sales volume would have provided a ﬁner-grained
measure of autonomy, but we are unaware of any large-scale, lon-
gitudinal study that uses sales data as a measure of interﬁrm rela-
tionships, because such data are not accessible. Following other
work (such as the arguments in Baker et al. 1998 for their Hypothe-
ses C1 and C4), we used a measure based on number of buyers
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Packard); and (3) the minor independents (all others,
e.g., Dort and Geronimo). We assigned each assembler
to one of the three status categories using Kennedy’s
(1941) year-by-year commentary. From early on, the
major assemblers stood apart in their impact on
industry evolution and in their economic success. In
1919, for example, they were the only three produc-
ers with net incomes over $10 million: Ford with $69
million, General Motors with $60 million, and Dodge
with $24 million (Kennedy 1941, p. 105). The major
independents had a lesser, but still signiﬁcant, pres-
ence in the industry. Kennedy (1941, p. 81) made the
point clearly: “The history of the automobile indus-
try has been the history of not more than twenty
companies.” The minor independents were the other
auto producers, many of which “now have no more
than an antiquarian interest and their signiﬁcance was
never great” (Kennedy 1941, p. 84).
As a check, we compared these categorizations with
descriptions in other contemporary texts. The status
categorization of assemblers changed only slightly
over time. Three assemblers spent several years strad-
dling two categories. Our results were robust to
moving these three assemblers between the higher
and lower of their possible status categories. We
denoted status with two dummy variables: medium
status (major independents) and high status (major
assemblers).
Control Variables
We deﬁned several ﬁrm- and industry-level control
variables.
Aggregate Customer Production. The aggregate
customer production variable recorded the total unit
production of all of a supplier’s customers in a
given year. Ideally, we would have recorded supplier-
speciﬁc sales to customers, but data about how many
clutches or carburetors each supplier sold to each
assembler in a given year did not exist. However,
suppliers that sold to large assemblers such as GM
and Ford would have tended to have greater aggre-
gate sales than suppliers that sold components only
to much smaller ﬁrms such as Dort and Geronimo.
Supplier Size. We took our measure of supplier
size from the Thomas Register of American Manufactur-
ers, which reports ﬁrm capitalization. Suppliers in our
sample ranged from size E (capitalization of $5,000–
$9,999) to AAAA (a rating higher than $1,000,000).
Our size variable, large supplier, equaled 1 if a supplier
was in category AAA ($500,000–$1,000,000 capitaliza-
tion) or higher, and 0 otherwise.
The variables for customer production and supplier
size helped differentiate the beneﬁts of scale from the
beneﬁts of customer status. Although high-status cus-
tomers also tended to be large ﬁrms, suppliers serv-
ing assemblers of similar status varied considerably
in the total production of the assemblers they served,
thus achieving different economies of scale. If the only
beneﬁts of serving high-status customers came from
customer scale, this effect would have been captured
by the aggregate production of all of a supplier’s cus-
tomers and by supplier size.
Firm Age. We created age variables, which are
common in studies of business failure. We measured
supplier age as the number of years elapsed since a
ﬁrm’s birth. When that information was not available,
generally for smaller suppliers, we generated a ran-
dom date of birth between the year when the earliest
suppliers appeared (1903 for clutches, 1907 for carbu-
retors) and 1917, the year prior to the beginning of our
observation period. We included a dummy variable
indicating the 14 carburetor suppliers and 9 clutch
suppliers with randomized founding dates to allow
for the possibility that their hazard rate differed sys-
temically from that of other suppliers.
Including supplier age and size helped address an
alternative argument, which is that a supplier’s capa-
bilities are the primary cause of its survival. His-
torical longitudinal studies of business survival, for
which ﬁne-grained measures of capabilities are typi-
cally not available, commonly use business age and
size as measures of capabilities to address this argu-
ment (Hannan 1998), on the assumption that ﬁrms
with stronger capabilities become older and larger
than ﬁrms with weak capabilities. Our use of these
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables in combination with the shared
frailty speciﬁcation addressed the alternative argu-
ment that unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc capabilities may
produce differential survival chances.
Competition and Demand. Finally, we created two
variables to assess competitive and demand condi-
tions. We measured competition as competitor den-
sity, using the number of suppliers of a compo-
nent in a given year. Drawing on empirical work in
organizational ecology, we also included the square
of this term in sensitivity analysis. On the demand
side, we included annual total U.S. auto production,
using data from Historical Statistics of the United States
(United States Bureau of the Census 1989).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. There was no
evidence of problematic multicollinearity. For carbu-
retors, the mean variance inﬂation factor (VIF) was
2.07 and the maximum VIF, 3.67. For clutches, the
mean VIF was 2.49 and the maximum, 4.85. All values
were well below 10, the conventional benchmark.
Results
Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of carbu-
retor and clutch supplier failure. The variance of the
unobserved heterogeneity parameter,  , does not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly from 0 in any model, indicating thatHoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell: Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
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Table 2 Piecewise Exponential Model of Supplier Failure Rates
Carburetors (low modularity) Clutches (high modularity)
1a 1b 1c 1d 2a 2b 2c 2d
Supplier age <5 years −2 041 −1 752 0 034 0 468 −1 918∗ −1 811∗ 2 200 2 172
 1 405   1 443   1 663   1 861   1 003   0 987   1 843   1 939 
Supplier age between 5 and 10 years −2 207 −1 071 1 154 1 618 −4 055∗∗ −3 749∗∗ 0 952 1 280
 1 489   1 533   1 741   1 875   1 126   1 130   1 951   2 029 
Supplier age greater than 10 years −3 783∗∗ −2 382 −0 456 0 393 −3 562∗∗ −3 221∗∗ 1 045 1 108
 1 594   1 561   1 809   1 892   1 104   1 096   1 922   1 990 
Competitor density (number of ﬁrms in industry) −0 012 0 021 0 072 0 018 0 037 0 022 0 017 0 005
 0 079   0 071   0 068   0 078   0 057   0 058   0 061   0 062 
Unknown foundingdate 1  008 0 777 0 766 0 905 1 691∗∗ 1 572∗∗ 0 997 0 862
 0 814   0 550   0 627   0 659   0 630   0 641   0 668   0 672 
Large supplier (Thomas register rating of −0 504 −0 308 −0 446 −0 439 −0 439 −0 555 −0 143 −0 025
AAA or better)  0 612   0 592   0 588   0 621   0 493   0 515   0 513   0 529 
Aggregate production of customers (millions) −1 132∗ −0 894 −1 481∗ −0 415 −0 829 −0 546 0 125 −1 282
 0 605   0 558   0 779   0 875   0 905   0 853   1 703   2 515 
Demand (National auto production in millions) 0 461 0 237 0 046 0 045 0 262 0 360 0 074 0 226
 0 303   0 263   0 284   0 302   0 245   0 259   0 274   0 332 
Maximum duration of customer relationship −0 271∗∗ −0 121∗ −0 099 −0 267 −0 013 −0 066
 0 094   0 086   0 089   0 234   0 212   0 220 
Current autonomy −1 402∗∗ −1 429∗∗ −2 078∗∗ −2 192∗
 0 479   0 505   0 745   0 776 
Potential autonomy −0 152 −0 059 −0 223∗ −0 243∗
 0 151   0 165   0 146   0 152 
Proportion of vertically integrated customers 1 821∗ 1 978 0 136 −0 086
 1 209   1 263   0 606   0 680 
Maximum customer status=medium −1 868∗∗ −0 191
 0 838   0 838 
Maximum customer status=high −1 815∗∗ 1 149
 0 961   1 356 
Observations 225 225 225 225 130 130 130 130
Log-likelihood −28 37 −22 61 −12 43 −7 99 −14 36 −13 65 −2 66 −2 20
Incremental log-likelihood chi-square  df  11 54  1 ∗∗∗ 20 35  3 ∗∗∗ 8 89  2 ∗∗ 1.43 (1) 21 97  3 ∗∗∗ 0.92 (2)
  (variance of unobserved heterogeneity) 0 36 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
Log-likelihood ratio test of   =0,  2 1  0 28 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00
Notes. Standard errors in brackets. Negative coefﬁcient=lower failure rate.
∗Signiﬁcant at 10%. ∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5%. ∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1%. One-tailed tests for hypotheses; two-tailed tests for control variables.
Assumingg amma distribution of shared frailty with variance  .
unobserved heterogeneity among suppliers did not
affect exit rates. Thus, unobserved supplier-speciﬁc
capabilities are not an alternative explanation for our
results.
Testing our hypotheses required comparing the
effect of the covariates on the survival of the sup-
pliers of low- and high-modularity components. We
begin by discussing the results separately for each
type of supplier. We then report the results of our
explicit tests for differences in the estimated coef-
ﬁcients across supplier types. For conciseness, we
present only the results for maximum duration in
the main text. Results for average duration, available
from the authors, are substantively equivalent, except
as noted below.
Models 1a to 1d in Table 2 present the results for
the population of carburetor suppliers, which produce
a low-modularity component. Model 1a contains the
control variables: supplier age periods, the unknown
founding date indicator, supplier size, aggregate cus-
tomer production, competitor density, and national
auto production. The piecewise analysis with three
age periods in Model 1a is a statistically signiﬁcant
improvement over a model holding the rate constant.
Models 1b, 1c, and 1d add relationship duration,
autonomy, and customer status in turn. The addition
of each factor signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt of the
model. The results are generally stable across models.
Turning to the full Model (1d), we ﬁnd that in a
model accounting for other aspects of a supplier’s rela-
tionships, maximum relationship duration does not
signiﬁcantly improve supplier survival (p =0 13, one-
tailed test). Potential autonomy is also far from signiﬁ-
cant (p =0 36, one-tailed). Lastly, having a customer ofHoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell: Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
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either medium or high status dramatically lowers the
failure rate for carburetor suppliers, relative to hav-
ing only low-status customers (ps = 0 012 and 0.029,
respectively, one-tailed). The effects of medium- and
high-status customers are statistically indistinguish-
able, suggesting that it was not necessary to have GM,
Ford, or Chrysler as a customer to receive an impri-
matur of quality. Instead, selling to Hudson, Nash, or
the other major independents sufﬁced.
Resultsfortheotheraspectsofautonomyaretheoret-
ically consistent. Failure rates for carburetor suppliers
decline with current autonomy (p = 0 004, two-tailed).
Thus, in the case of selling low-modularity compo-
nents, current autonomy improves supplier survival,
whereas potential autonomy does not, suggesting that
it is difﬁcult to switch suppliers for low-modularity
components. The impact of having a large pro-
portion of customers that are vertically integrated
into production of a supplier’s component somewhat
increases the likelihood of supplier failure, although
signiﬁcance is only marginal (p = 0 108, two-tailed).
Buyers with experience making a component are well
positioned to replace a supplier with internal pro-
duction, putting them in advantageous positions for
bargaining with external suppliers. In parallel with
the ﬁndings for current autonomy, this result suggests
that suppliers suffer when dealing with buyers that
have credible internal or external options for replac-
ing them.
We now turn to the second set of models in Table 2,
which report the results for clutch suppliers, our pro-
ducers of a high-modularity component. Model 2a
introduces the control variables, which tend to affect
the failure rate in the same direction as in the car-
buretor analysis, but only the unknown founding
date variable is statistically signiﬁcant (p =0 004, two-
tailed).
Looking at the fully speciﬁed model, Model 2d, we
ﬁnd that maximum relationship duration has no effect
on supplier survival (p = 0 46, one-tailed). Poten-
tial autonomy has a moderately signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the failure of modular suppliers (p = 0 059,
one-tailed), which it does not for suppliers of low-
modularity components. Lastly, relative to having
only low-status customers, clutch suppliers gain no
survival beneﬁt from having customers of medium
or high status (ps = 0 40 and 0.19, respectively, one-
tailed). This result is consistent with our reasoning
that buyers of modular components may not require
external signals of quality.
Current autonomy reduces failure (p = 0 005, two-
tailed), as it did for carburetor suppliers. The
implication is that current autonomy inﬂuences the
performance of all suppliers by providing a combina-
tion of current sales, immediate alternatives, and/or
direct negotiation power with existing customers.
Suppliers of highly modular components do not
incur a higher failure rate by selling to vertically
integrated customers (p = 0 89, two-tailed), a ﬁnd-
ing that contrasts with the results for low-modularity
components. A possible explanation is that it is rela-
tively easy for buyers to start production of a high-
modularity component because such components are
self-contained. Thus, the presence or absence of inter-
nal production among a supplier’s customers does
not change the credibility of customers’ threats to
replace the supplier with internal production. In con-
trast, it is more difﬁcult for a buyer to begin produc-
tion of a low-modularity component, which requires
both component- and systems-level knowledge. Thus,
for a low-modularity component, the presence or
absence of existing internal production among a sup-
plier’s buyers signiﬁcantly changes the credibility of
customers’ threats to replace the supplier.
Although we could not test this explanation, the
data were consistent with our conjecture that auto
assemblers could more easily begin producing high-
modularity clutches than low-modularity carburetors.
Of the 200 auto assemblers that were not vertically
integrated into carburetors when they entered the
data, only ﬁve subsequently produced their own car-
buretors (2.5%) and, of these, only one did so for
more than one year. By contrast, of the 155 assemblers
that did not manufacture clutches when they entered
the data, 15 later produced their own clutches (9.7%),
doing so for an average of over three years.5
In sum, the results for the suppliers of both types of
component are largely consistent with our arguments.
In keeping with Hypothesis 2, potential autonomy
helps only suppliers of high-modularity components,
which can more easily switch to new buyers. In keep-
ing with Hypothesis 3, having high-status customers
helps only suppliers of low-modularity components,
for which buyers value high supplier legitimacy.
Duration, the subject of Hypothesis 1, is insigniﬁcant
for both components in the fully speciﬁed models.
We now compare the effect of maximum tie dura-
tion, potential autonomy, and customer status across
component type, explicitly testing the hypotheses.
Table 3 presents the results of difference-between-
means tests (Miner et al. 1990; Wonnacott and Wonna-
cott 1977, p. 214) for the two fully speciﬁed models, 1d
and 2d. Reinforcing the results found by examining
each component separately, formally testing the sig-
niﬁcance of the difference in coefﬁcients across com-
ponents provides strong support for Hypotheses 2
and 3 and more limited support for Hypothesis 1.
Supporting Hypothesis 1, we ﬁnd that maximum
relationship duration is greater for low-modularity
5 At some point in our data, 13 assemblers produced carburetors
internally, and 70 produced clutches.Hoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell: Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
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Table 3Difference in Covariate Effects Across Component Types
 (carburetor)  (clutch) Absolute difference
Low modularity High modularity between coefﬁcients p(difference>0)
H1 Max. duration of cust. −0 099 −0 066 0.033 0 052
relationship
H2 Potential autonomy −0 059 −0 243 0.184 <0 01
H3 Maximum customer −1 868 −0 191 1.676 <0 01
status=medium
H3 Maximum customer −1 815 1 148 2.964 <0 01
status=high
Current autonomy −1 429 −2 192 0.763 <0 01
Prop. of vertically 1 978 −0 086 2.063 <0 01
integrated customer
Note. Negative coefﬁcient = lower failure rate. One-tail tests for hypothesized comparisons; two-tailed tests for
others.
component suppliers to a statistically signiﬁcant de-
gree (p = 0 052, one-tailed). However, in sensitivity
analysis using average rather than maximum dura-
tion, the coefﬁcients for duration did not differ signiﬁ-
cantly (p =0 245) across components. Thus, we do not
interpret this difference as strong support of Hypoth-
esis 1.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 received much stronger sup-
port. Potential autonomy has a signiﬁcantly stronger
effect for suppliers of highly modular components
(p<0 001, one-tailed), supporting Hypothesis 2. In
turn, both medium and high customer status have a
larger effect on suppliers of low-modularity compo-
nents (p<0 001 for both, one-tailed), which supports
Hypothesis 3.
For other aspects of autonomy, the larger beneﬁt of
current autonomy for producers of high-modularity
components (p<0 001, two-tailed) suggests that a
more modular component allows a supplier to gain
scale economies across multiple customers. Having a
large proportion of vertically integrated customers is
more harmful to suppliers of low-modularity compo-
nents, a ﬁnding consistent with the argument above.
We conducted several sensitivity analyses. Investi-
gation of alternative measures of relationship dura-
tion and customer status showed no signiﬁcant
impact of nonmonotonic maximum relationship dura-
tion (maximum duration squared), a Herﬁndahl index
of the concentration of relationship durations, min-
imum customer status, or mean customer status in
either the carburetor or clutch results. The results did
not change when we dropped the density variable
to check whether an arithmetic relationship between
density and autonomy might affect the results. The
square of the density variable was never signiﬁcant.
The data on clutch suppliers ended in 1937, and the
data on carburetor suppliers continued until 1942.
The reported results reﬂect use of the full data set.
When we reestimated the carburetor supplier disso-
lution models using only data for the period until
1937, the only substantive change was that the effect
of the proportion of vertically integrated customers on
carburetor supplier dissolution was no longer signiﬁ-
cant, although it remained positive. Lastly, we found
similar results when we replaced the gamma distri-
bution for shared frailty with an inverse Gaussian
distribution.
Discussion
This study shows that key aspects of customer rela-
tionships inﬂuence suppliers of low- and high-modu-
larity components differently.
Consequences of Modularity
We contribute directly to the growing literature on
modularity in two ways. First, we extend research on
modularity’s effects on buyers, which have been the
focus of the modularity literature, to suppliers. Sec-
ond, we reﬁne understanding of modularity’s impact
on interﬁrm relationships. We found that suppliers
of high-modularity components beneﬁted more from
potential autonomy, and suppliers of low-modularity
components beneﬁted more from ties to high-status
customers. In addition, the results for customer sta-
tus pointed to a less prominent feature of modularity.
For a modular component, potential buyers do not
value the signal generated by a supplier selling to
a prominent customer. This suggests that modularity
diminishes ambiguity about how well a component
will perform once integrated into an end product, so
that the buyer is able to evaluate the component in
isolation without having to consider a web of interac-
tions with other components.
We suggest two possible explanations for the lack
of evidence for a positive effect of either maximum
or average relationship duration in the full models
for both components. First, the absence of evidence
might be an industry-speciﬁc ﬁnding, if neither com-
ponent studied here posed an extreme enough engi-
neering challenge to reward extended relationships.Hoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell: Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
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However, contemporary engineering literature and
the signiﬁcant results for the other variables suggest
that this is not the case. A more intriguing explanation
is that, just as the advantages of long-term relation-
ships are greater for low-modularity components than
for high-modularity ones, the disadvantages may also
be greater for low-modularity components.
In a long-term supply relationship for a low-mod-
ularity component, the relationship-speciﬁc routines
and technological knowledge become even more spe-
cialized and more weakly related to developments
in an overall industry, which may be progressing
more quickly or along different technological trajec-
tories (Uzzi 1997). Performance suffers, yet the spe-
cialization discourages termination of the relationship
(Gargiulo and Benassi 2000). The generality of the
routines and knowledge required for high-modularity
components reduces this problem. Our data do not
allow us to conﬁrm or reject these explanations unam-
biguously, but we hope future studies will examine
further the balance of beneﬁts and constraints that
long-term relationships generate.
Our results also speak to the interﬁrm relation-
ship literature by pointing to a contingency common
to all three supplier relationship characteristics stud-
ied here. The beneﬁts and constraints of a ﬁrm’s
relationships derive in large part from their needs
(see Ahuja 2000 for similar conclusions regarding the
effect of structural holes in collaboration networks on
innovation). Relationships that require considerable
trust and/or extensive interﬁrm routines produce
both greater beneﬁts and greater constraints than less
intense relationships. Furthermore, relationship struc-
ture is more important for buyer–supplier connections
that require high trust and extensive coordination.
It is worth considering how our results might have
differed if we had examined suppliers’ ﬁnancial per-
formance rather than their survival. We speculate that
the survival beneﬁts provided by afﬁliation with a
high-status customer may come at the cost of lower
proﬁt margins. High-status customers may be in a
position to strip rents from their suppliers (see, e.g.,
Caves and Uekusa 1976). However, this buyer ability
has limits—although they can deﬂate supplier prof-
itability, it is not in buyers’ interests to do so to the
degree that their suppliers fail. Moreover, autonomy
will be particularly important here. We expect auton-
omy to improve proﬁtability because suppliers with
autonomy are better positioned to reject attempts to
extract rents. This prediction might well apply to both
low- and high-modularity components. We expect
that long-term ties will contribute to a supplier’s
ﬁnancial performance, as suppliers will capture some
part of the value generated and beneﬁt from the reluc-
tance of their buyers to terminate relationships. Fur-
ther research examining ﬁnancial performance would
have managerial and theoretical interest.
Managerial Implications
Our ﬁndings suggest that suppliers will ﬁnd the value
of their customer relationships changing in a world
of increasing modularity. The reputation boost that
selling to prominent customers once offered suppli-
ers will fade as customers are better able to directly
evaluate how well the suppliers’ more modular com-
ponents meet their needs. Nonetheless, suppliers can
also beneﬁt from these changes. A series of short-term
relationships with different customers may become a
viable strategy, giving suppliers ﬂexibility in seeking
out customers. A start-up ﬁrm is more able to succeed
by virtue of the quality of its product, even before it
gains the legitimacy that comes from sales to a large
company. This is a signiﬁcant beneﬁt because new
ﬁrms often lack the capacity or contacts to win orders
from industry leaders.
This work also informs trends in the evolution of
supplier relationships (Schilling and Steensma 2001,
Vickery et al. 1999, Achrol 1997). When ambiguity
about quality is high, ﬁrms tend to trade only with
ﬁrms of similar status (Podolny 1994). Because high
modularity reduces ambiguity about quality, trading
between ﬁrms of different statuses should become
more common as modularity increases. Knowledge-
able buyers and suppliers will continue to avoid
dependence on a small number of trading partners;
ﬁrms with few partners will seek to increase the num-
ber of their partners.
Limitations and Extensions
Our study shares the limitations of other single-indus-
try studies, although we found no obvious idiosyn-
crasies that would strongly limit generalization to
other settings. Our empirical tests covered a dynamic
period of the industry cycle in which there was sub-
stantial entry and exit of suppliers. We believe that the
same inﬂuences will apply during more stable peri-
ods, but they may be less pronounced if other fac-
tors such as economies of scale contribute to supplier
longevity. Examination of this issue would be infor-
mative.
Other extensions are possible. One could assess
whether the impact of modularity is greater during
periods of beneﬁcial or adverse industry conditions.
Modularity may have the greatest impact during
downturns in an industry, when adaptation oppor-
tunities are particularly valuable and constraints are
particularly binding. We believe that pursuing this
comparison will be fruitful for continuing work.
In studying the impact of modularity on suppliers,
we address a lacuna in the growing literature on mod-
ularity, which has emphasized buyers. Modularity
is neither unconditionally advantageous nor uncon-
ditionally disadvantageous for suppliers; instead,
increasing modularity requires changing strategies inHoetker, Swaminathan, and Mitchell: Modularity and the Impact of Buyer–Supplier Relationships on the Survival of Suppliers
190 Management Science 53(2), pp. 178–191, ©2007 INFORMS
the relationships that suppliers form and maintain.
More generally, we show the connection between the
coordination requirements of a supplier’s relation-
ships and the beneﬁts and constraints that the rela-
tionships create.
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